SD MUNI CALLS FORMER KING A MONKEY IN A NEPALI NEWSPAPER AND LIKENS POLITICAL PARTIES TO FIGHTNG CATS

INTERVIEW

INDIAN RETIRED PROF. S D MUNI INSULTINGLY CALLS FORMER KING A MONKEY, LIKENS POLITICAL PARTIES TO FIGHTNG CATS; CONFIRMS INDIA’S CHANGED NEPAL POLICY AS BUBURAM TAKES OVR SINGHA DURBAR

Dr Muni talked with John Narayan Parajuli and Prashant Jha in an interview with The Kathmandu Post Monday.


How do you see the election of Baburam Bhattarai as Prime Minister?
I think a new government's coming is a very hopeful sign. And as you know, it has generated expectations and hopes all over the country. When you analyse it, there are two-three things which have happened.
One, there is a significant change within the Maoist. Because of their own internal party churning, for the first time, they have taken a party resolution that they would address the concerns of the other parties which they have been voicing so far -- on property, on peace process, on integration. The leaders were saying it all along, but more in a positioning sense and the rhetorical sense, rather than in the action-oriented implementation sense, because they had no party mandate to do what they are doing. Therefore this is a significant change.

Prachanda, as chief, has realised that people outside the party are not prepared to accept him as the leader. So they changed the leader. Baburam, whatever his personal qualities or disqualifications, has consistently said he is committed to move the peace process forward. He also has a cleaner image, and an efficient image, because as a finance minister, I guess, even the bourgeoisie industrialists in Nepal had come to accept him, that though he has a Maoist profile, he was willing to go along and do things.
Both Prachanda and Baburam have now publicly declared that the extremist section within the party has to be contained, if the peace process has to proceed further. That had not happened earlier.
So in a way now, there is a much greater element of transparency within the Maoist, who stands here and who is willing to go in which direction, which of course has weakened the party, in terms of its political parameter, there are lot of tensions inside, lot of disagreements inside, but it sends a signal to the rest of the people, or other political parties, that they are now they are meaningfully poised to proceed in that direction. That's a big change.
Second, I think there was a big shift in India's policy. In the last two years, India consistently preferred a political arrangement which would not have had Maoist in it or in a dominant position. What they have realised now is that this is counter-productive, that it is not working and it has neither served India's specific interest in terms of stability and order in Nepal. Nor it has served the interest of Nepal. And I think there is some, may be tactical, may be strategic, there is some shift that ok, let's go back and since the changes have taken place amongst the Maoist, in leadership, in party, they want to give it a chance. And therefore India has not played any negative role.
Third, the Madhes parties. The Madhes parties were always, in terms of their interest, relatively closer to the Maoist than to other political parties, essentially on federalism, essentially on the treatment which is being given to Madhes leaders within UML or within Nepali Congress (NC) or anywhere else. But they got split, they got disintegrated, they are still a fragmented lot, but they have decided to throw their weight collectively, not withstanding their own internal differences. That's a major achievement.
When Baburam Bhattarai was elected, there was some initial momentum on the peace process, including the Maoist decision to hand over the keys. But the momentum seems to have dissipated. Where do you think there is the problem right now?
Now, the question of other parameters of integration like the package, numbers, ranks, is with the special committee technically. Unless this special committee reaches consensus, you can't move on all these issues. Even if you have an informal understanding, there are still huge differences, partly oriented politically amongst the three or four major components of the political system. And the Nepali Congress and UML don’t seem to have come to this conclusion that we must join hands with the Maoist initiative to take the peace process to its concluding order.
People say there are technical nuances, but essentially this is a political decision. Now why it is so critical a political decision is because the question before UML and the NC is that if the Maoist leadership concludes the peace process, what is in it which they have for themselves politically. Therefore, intrinsically, they want an ownership of the peace process. For that ownership, they have to bargain with the Maoist. You know, the Maoist unilateral decision that we will finish this doesn’t mean that they have offered ownership to all of them. Of course they went and said, join the government, but joining the government is one way and ownership of the peace process that it is not done alone, it is done by all of us, is another thing. And I think the Maoist must come forward to assure two things -- one, that they should be willing to share ownership of the peace process with other political parties and secondly, they should ensure that electoral battle would be with equal playing ground. This is a process which is on, to my mind. They are gradually shedding of the hesitations to engage with each other and come to some conclusion. Once that happens, the special committee would move very fast. So, it seems that one can say that the Maoist came with a bang and now it is dissipated. But the actual problem lies in the broken consensus, which has got to be rebuilt, at least to some extent and I guess, NC, being a much older and major party, must make up its mind. And I have a feeling that NC moves in this direction, probably UML would also be persuaded to move in that direction.
There is talk about the government taking unilateral decision on integration with tacit approval of the UML or the NC, because they have to take something for their constituencies too. Did you get any sense that the UML and NC were willing to let that happen?
They are in a dilemma whether to go ahead or not to go ahead. As I mentioned to you very clearly in my initial remarks that everybody is looking for it as what is in it for me, what is in it for us, do we politically lose or we politically gain, by doing this. And it seems they have not yet come to a very firm decision. Certainly not Maoist and certainly not the NC and you have seen this internal churning within NC. They have not yet sorted out their own internal power equations. In fact, I don’t know if you would recall, I wrote earlier that the basic crux behind this whole political arrangement is the sharing power.
What can be the new elements of power sharing arrangements which gives all sides the ownership you were referring to earlier? Does it mean the NC should join this government, does it mean rotational kind of system?

This depends on the political ingenuity of the Nepali political forces. Rotation is the one principle. Every one says he wants to a deputy prime minister, he wants a prime minister. It may sound very ridiculous, but what is the harm if you have 10 deputy prime ministers? Now it looks ridiculous that it is all power game. But this power nautanki seems essential at this stage, to rebuild the consensus. I will give you an example and this is not unique for Nepal, I can tell you, because unfortunately, Nepali thinkers and decision makers don’t look outside Nepal. Go to the Cambodian situation. After the struggle, when Cambodians came to power, there was a situation that there were three prime ministers. Co-prime ministers from all the three factions. So let us experiment with all these because, to my mind, that is a minor issue.
But the other parties must keep in mind that the Maoists are in the dominant position and they have to lead. And the Maoist must accept that though they are leading, they cannot deliver by themselves. Therefore you have to take people along. Actually that was realised in 2005-2006 when they had to confront a very assertive monarchy, within an existing international system. And therefore they joined hands. Many of these finer points, which have come up today, actually existed then. And if you look at the 12-points or even to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, none of them were spelled out in details. Largely, why they were not spelled out in details because they were given secondary importance, primary importance was given to consensus. I think there is a need for that, even now. In terms of spelling out terms of constitutional provisions, the nature of federalism, the nature of government, they have to harmonise and compromise with themselves because the real nut-bolt issues are confronting them now. So, it’s far more difficult to recreate the consensus because what the structure or architecture of polity which appear now, is actually going to take you to the future whereas the interim arrangement was all transitory.
The problems arise not only from the power structure problem outside, but also the broken power structure within each of the parties which is very strange but is a reality. The UML is not sure who the acknowledged leader of their party is. The NC is struggling between Deuba and Sushil factions. The Maoists are worried, that they have put this on the table. And I am sorry to say that even the Madhes are confronting the same problem. So unless the party units are homogenous, they cannot bargain, they cannot deal in a compact manner and if you can’t deal with compact manner that every faction is looking for share in power. This internal faction struggle hopefully is sorted out earlier.
Personally, I, in any such situation of transition, theoretically would expect another phase of polarisation, because, after Jana Andolan II, people had got together without sorting out their ideological issues. I have met many people in NC who said we were not in favour of 12-point agreement, we were not in favour of Jana Andolan II, in fact many of them did not come to the streets, either in UML, or in NC, and they are no heart in it. It is this Jana Andolan, in which they had no heart, which is now dictating them to create a new Nepal. So they have no stakes in new Nepal. Let factions within the UML or the NC come out and say very clearly – “look, we didn’t like it; we want to go back to 1990 constitution”. It is there but it has not been articulated. And I think, the best situation is that they patch up their differences and endorse the new Nepal concept and go along. The worst is, that they put their cards on the table and polarise the situation. And then you would definitely have two ideological poles – not Maoists and democrats, but the “new Nepal and not new Nepal”. And that new Nepal, in which, there may be contradictory forces like NC or the Maoist or the factions within UML, would then create the consensus for new Nepal, I have no doubt about it.
You mentioned earlier, that there has been shift in Indian policy. In 2005, especially during the 12-point, India was the facilitator and, some would say, it was the external guarantor. Do you think Delhi is now willing to invest its political capital, or do you think it should, to enable a similar agreement to provide insurance to all sides?
Well, I would say that is a terrible weakness of the Nepali political system. I get the point you were saying that yes, there should be an external guarantor. And it is an unfortunate reality of the Nepali political situation that after 1990, these political factions were looking for a guarantor in the King. And to sort out their mutual differences, they went to the King to tilt the balance. The king having gone, these people have not yet matured, I would say. And they are still looking for a guarantor. They are still looking for an outsider. And this is where the role of India is, which is, sometimes India unwillingly, is dragged into the Nepali political situation, sometimes India is tempted to intervene into the Nepali political situation, because of the internal fragmentation here and because India has its own national interest in the stability of Nepal. So once they see that there is a chaos here, which will create a situation uncomfortable for them, they intervene into the situation. There is no doubt about it.
But I give you two/three examples, which shows very clearly that when there is will power amongst the Nepali political forces to sort out their own affairs by themselves, it is possible. One example was the Karan Singh mission. Karan Singh came with an Indian agenda, talked to the king and king made the first declaration. And it was not acceptable to the major players. And all the three major players said – sorry, we won’t bite this. What happened? India had to eat humble pie and revise the position and within three days, the King had to come up with another declaration.
Second example is the UML-Maoist government. It was certainly not the Indian agenda, not a preferred agenda. But the government came. Government came because two of the major factions got together. To a very large extent, you can even say that if Madhesis had really decided in forming the present formation, what is it, which India could do even if it did not want it? Therefore, these are small little examples in which it becomes very clear that once there is a broader consensus of the major political forces within Nepal, India has little role. And they don’t need a guarantee. UML and the Maoists did not need a guarantor. I think even some of the clauses of the four point agreement between the Maoist and the Madhesis do not call for a guarantor. They are each other’s guarantor. You give us this space, we give you this space, and this is where we are.
I know every Nepali is almost preoccupied with what India does or what India does not do. But they don’t look inward. Because of the last 20 years practice from 1990, that if you are insecure from within yourself, you always look for an external guarantor. If you are secure within, you don’t. The Indian political coalitions don’t come with the approval of either the US or the USSR or anybody else. To that extent, the Bangladeshi political coalitions don’t look towards India. The Sri Lankans don’t look towards India. Why is it that the Nepalis should always be looking towards India? I mean I have never been able to appreciate this point. I understand it, but I cannot appreciate. You have heard that story of monkeys and the fighting cats. Now if the fighting cats can’t sort out their businesses, they will look for a monkey. The King was the monkey earlier for the fighting political parties here. Once the King was gone, they discovered Delhi as another monkey. I don’t know why they should be doing it.

What do you see on the new constitution that is in the offing? Do you think that is going to provide the basis for the durable, democratic and political system?
Documents like constitutions are inherently transitional. There is no constitution in the world which is once and final. Constitutions evolve. Look at the way India’s constitution has evolved, or any other country’s democracy has evolved. Therefore the present constitution should be a document which serves your contemporary needs with a view on the future. There is no doubt about it. But if the situations change, the constitutions would change. Now in this constitution, where you are stuck today, are two critical areas. One is the -- and I would say go back to the 12-point understanding, not because it was to throw the King out but it had other very essential components -- inclusive democracy. How do you define inclusive democracy? Straight away, you come to federalism. Whether it is a village-level-based federalism or devolution of power or whether it is a regional or district level, whether it is an ethnicity based or whatever. You now cannot keep the marginalised social groups out of the decision making power structure. So you evolve any formula, but you have to bring them in. So this is very critical. Otherwise, even if you write that constitution, it will collapse.
The second is the political order, where I think both the parties and the Maoists must realise that what they had said was democracy. Now, total absolute democracy doesn’t mean totalitarian society, that one party dictates everything. And the Maoist must be absolutely clear in their mind that if they have any idea of doing so in the future, they can forget about it. So, I think, these are the two critical areas. And if they can keep the core consensus point in mind, that inclusive democratic order, they can sort out the constitution. The final details, if you can’t work out now, you can leave it.
Are there any other complications in the peace process?
One other thing else which has taken place in the peace process is the changing of the goal post. Let us go back to the CPA or even before that. The Maoist consistently said that our armed cadres will have to be integrated. It was accepted. The concept of two armies came. They started talking about it. Now once the elections result came out, and the political balance got tilted in favour of the Maoist, the political parties went back and resurrected army as a major stakeholder in the integration process, which it was not to be. As a result, now I think a kind of packages which are coming up, are essentially dictated or defined by the army. And what the political parties are insisting on is the Maoist to adjust with that.
Now I have raised this question with Maoist and with other political parties that you had asked about the democratisation of the army. When the 2005 February coup took place, you were all worried about use of army for political purposes by the then King. And you said this Nepali army will have to be disciplined. Where is that agenda? I don’t see it anywhere. And that is one of the problems for the internal tension and conflict within the Maoist. Because the army against whom the PLA cadres fought are now saying – “no no, how can you be equal to me in terms of rank? We are the ones who will decide about it”. I mean it is understandable in many other ways but it is not understandable from the point of view of the Maoist insurgents, put it this way. And where the Maoist insurgents created huge excesses, it should not be ignored. So did the army. Now the whole process is putting accountability on one side, and to that extent, you see more problems, tensions and complexities which have come up in the integration process.
I think the democratisation of the army is an issue which needs to be brought on the table, in one way or the other. Because you don’t need such a big army, you know, it is because of this that the Madhes is putting out this demand that you should have 10000 or 15000 from our side to go into the army. The army is very essential and without that no state exists. But this question of democratisation and streamlining must be brought back.
Nnnn